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Do Renormalization Group Explanations 
Conform to the Commonality Strategy? 
 
Alexander Reutlinger 
 
Abstract. Renormalization group (RG) explanations account for the astonishing 
phenomenon that microscopically very different physical systems display the 
same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. Among philosophers, 
this explanandum phenomenon is often described as the occurrence of a 
particular kind of multiply realized macro-behavior. In several recent 
publications, Robert Batterman denies that RG explanations account for this 
explanandum phenomenon by following (what I call) the commonality strategy, 
i.e. by identifying properties that microscopically very different physical systems 
have in common. Arguing against Batterman’s claim, I defend the view that RG 
explanations are in accord with the commonality strategy.    
 
Contents 
1. Introduction 
2. RG Explanations, the Commonality Strategy, and Batterman’s Claim 
3. The Core Elements of RG Explanations 
4. Defending the Commonality Strategy 
5. Conclusion 
 
  2 
1. Introduction 
So-called renormalization group explanations (RG explanations, for short) in 
statistical physics have received a lot of attention in the recent literature on 
scientific explanation, idealization, reduction and emergence. And rightly so, 
since RG explanations have several philosophically challenging and puzzling 
features in being potentially non-causal, highly idealized (in involving limit 
theorems), and arguably non-reductive explanations.1 In this paper, I will not 
address any of these fascinating philosophical issues. My aim is more modest 
and largely independent of questions surrounding the causal vs. non-causal, 
highly idealized, and reductive vs. non-reductive character of RG explanations. 
Against prominent claims to the contrary, I will defend the view that RG 
explanations are not special and quite intuitive in one crucial respect: RG 
explanations explain the phenomenon that microscopically different physical 
systems display the same macro-behavior (in certain circumstances, which I will 
present below) by referring to features that those physical systems have in 
common, although the physical systems at issue are different in many other 
respects. I will call this broad explanatory strategy the ‘commonality strategy’ 
(borrowing this terminology from Papineau 1993 and Lange 2015).  
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I will sketch the 
commonality strategy and Batterman’s claim that RG explanations do not 
conform to this strategy. In section 3, I present the core elements of the physics 
of RG explanations. In section 4, I defend the view that RG explanations 
conform to the commonality strategy, contrary to Batterman’s claim.  
                                                
1 See Batterman (2000, 2002), Butterfield (2011), Morrison (2012), Norton 
(2012), Menon and Callender (2013), Hüttemann et al. (2015), and Reutlinger 
(2014a, 2014b, forthcoming).  
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2. RG Explanations, the Commonality Strategy, and Batterman’s 
Claim 
RG explanations are intended to provide the explanation of an astonishing fact: 
of why microscopically very different physical systems display the same macro-
behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. For instance, near the critical 
temperature, the phenomenology of transitions of a fluid from a liquid to a 
vaporous phase, or of a metal from a magnetic to a demagnetized phase is (in 
some respects) the same, although liquids and metals are significantly different 
on the micro-level. This ‘sameness’ or – to use a technical term – ‘universality’ 
of the macro-behavior is characterized by a critical exponent that takes the same 
value for microscopically very different systems (for instance, Batterman 2000: 
125-126; see Fisher 1982; Cardy 1996; McComb 2004; Strevens forthcoming).2  
In the philosophical literature, the universality of macro-behavior is 
typically interpreted in terms of the multiple realizability of a kind of macro-
behavior. To take one prominent example, Batterman interprets RG explanations 
as meeting the “challenge of multiple realizability”: “How can systems that are 
heterogeneous at some (typically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of 
behavior at the macro-scale?” (Batterman 2015: 8). The challenge of multiple 
realizability encoded in Batterman’s why-question goes back to Fodor’s 
famously scandalizing way of articulating the request for an explanation of the 
fact that there is multiply realized macro-behavior: 
 
                                                
2 The critical exponent typically figures in an equation describing the order 
parameter of the physical systems in question (that is, a macroscopic physical 
quantity such as magnetization), in relation to the so-called reduced temperature. 
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“Damn near everything we know about the world suggests that 
unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at 
the extreme micro-level manage somehow to converge on stable 
macro-level properties. […] [T]he ‘somehow’, really is entirely 
mysterious […] why there should be (how there could be) macro 
level regularities at all in a world where, by common consent, macro 
level stabilities have to supervene on a buzzing, blooming confusion 
of micro level interactions.” (Fodor 1997: 161) 
 
Fodor demands an explanation for how it is possible that multiply realized 
macro-regularities obtain given the “confusion of micro level interactions”. 
Following Fodor’s approach, Batterman, by and large, equates universality and 
multiple realizability in stating that the explanandum of RG explanations is why 
a certain macroscopic property is multiply realized (Batterman 2000: 117; 2002: 
72; 2015: 8). 
How do RG explanations account for multiply realized or universal 
macro-behavior? Without going into the details of RG explanations for now (see 
section 3 for a brief exposition of the physics of RG explanations), one obvious 
and abstract answer might be that universality is explained by that fact that (a) 
microscopically different systems S1 and S2 exhibiting the same macro-behavior 
have a property in common, although they are very different in many respects, 
and that (b) this shared property helps to explain the fact that S1 and S2 display 
the same macro-behavior near criticality. Let me call this general explanatory 
strategy the ‘commonality strategy’. Batterman ascribes the commonality 
strategy to Papineau:  
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“For Papineau, the reducibility of some special science property 
to physics requires ‘only that there should be some physical 
property present in all and only [the distinct realizers of the 
special science property]. The presence of such a common 
property will then provide ‘a uniform physical explanation of why 
those instances always give rise to a certain sort of result’ 
(Papineau [1993], p. 35).” (Batterman 2000: 135-136) 
 
Papineau illustrates the commonality strategy as follows. Taking thermodynamic 
behavior as a paradigmatic example of multiply realized macro-behavior in 
physics, Papineau asks how it is possible that microscopically different gases 
obey the ideal gas law: “After all, aren’t there lots of different ways in which the 
molecules can be moving around in a gas at a given temperature, thus giving us a 
heterogeneity of physical states for the single macro-state of having that 
temperature?” (Papineau 1993: 35). Papineau answers that this case of multiple 
realizability – like many other cases – can be explained by applying the 
commonality strategy: 
 
“[T]here is still something physically in common between all 
those different physical states, namely, that the molecules have a 
given mean kinetic energy. It is this commonality that then 
enables us to explain such things as why an increase in 
temperature at constant volume always results in an increase in 
pressure.” (ibid.) 
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In other words, Papienau holds that microscopically different gases share a 
property – their mean kinetic energy. This property helps to explain why 
microscopically different gases display the same macro-behavior which is 
captured by the ideal gas law. This is a paradigmatic instance of the 
commonality strategy.  
It is worth emphasizing right away that (a) the mean kinetic energy 
provides an explanation of the macro-behavior at issue only in concert with other 
theoretical resources of statistical mechanics (including bridge laws, statistical 
principles, and the general dynamical laws of classical mechanics), and that (b) 
these other theoretical resources of statistical mechanics are applicable to 
microscopically very different physical systems. I will return to this point in 
Section 4.  
One may add to Papineau’s presentation of the example that the 
statistical-mechanical explanation of the ideal gas law he refers to is not merely 
available for addressing how various (actual or possible) micro states of one and 
the same gas made up of the same molecules give rise to a certain macro-
behavior (the case Papineau explicitly discusses), but the statistical-mechanical 
explanation also illuminates why different micro states of two (or more) gases 
made up of different kinds of molecules may display the same kind of macro-
behavior. 
However, Batterman claims that RG explanations “differ significantly in 
kind from Papineau’s explanation of the temperature/pressure relation” 
(Batterman 2000: 136). Batterman argues that RG explanations do not follow the 
commonality strategy: “my point has been that the RG account explains the 
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universality of critical phenomena without finding any such property” (ibid.; 
emphasis added). Batterman also endorses the same argument in more recent 
work (Batterman 2002: 72-73, 2015: 8-9; Batterman and Rice 2014: 373).  
Let me briefly pause to add a disclaimer. For Batterman, the claim that 
the commonality strategy does not apply to RG explanations plays a role in a 
larger argument for the failure of reduction in the context of RG explanations 
(see Batterman 2000, 2002, 2015). In this paper, I will not be concerned with the 
question whether a defense of the commonality strategy with respect to RG 
explanation supports reductionism (see Reutlinger 2014b for a discussion of the 
reductive character of RG explanations). My sole aim is to argue that RG 
explanations, interesting and unusual as they may be in other respects, are not 
special when it comes to following the commonality strategy for explaining 
multiply realized macro-behavior. 
 
3. The Core Elements of RG Explanations 
How do physicists explain the remarkable fact that there is universal macro-
behavior by using RG explanations? My strategy in this section is to focus on the 
physics of RG explanations. The following brief exposition of the relevant 
physics will be non-technical because the paper is concerned with a non-
technical question (Batterman 2000: 137-144; for a more technical exposition 
see Fisher 1982, 1998; Wilson 1983; McComb 2004).  
Since it is not relevant for my argument in this paper, I will not attempt to 
provide a discussion of which philosophical theory of explanation applies to RG 
explanations (for instance, Butterfield 2011 and Norton 2012 favor a covering-
law approach to RG explanations, while Reutlinger forthcoming argues that a 
  8 
counterfactual theory of scientific explanation applies to RG explanations). For 
present purposes, I will simply assume that some philosophical theory of 
explanation adequately captures the explanatory character of RG explanations.  
For the sake of brevity, it is useful to understand the workings of RG 
explanations as consisting of three key elements:  
 
I. Hamiltonians,  
II. RG transformations, and  
III. the flow of Hamiltonians.  
 
Strictly speaking, there is also a fourth element – the laws of statistical 
mechanics, including dynamical laws and the partition function – which I will 
leave in the background, for the sake of brevity (Norton 2012: 227; Wilson 
1983).  
Let me now present the core elements of the physics of RG explanations in 
more detail: 
 
I. Hamiltonians: The Hamiltonian is a function characterizing, among other 
things, the energy of the interactions between the components of the system. 
One characteristic of a physical system undergoing a (continuous) phase 
transition is that the correlation length diverges and becomes infinite. That is, 
the state of every component becomes correlated not only with the states of 
its nearby components but also with the states of very distant components. 
The correlation length diverges, although each component interacts merely 
locally with its nearby neighbors (Batterman 2000: 126, 137-138).  
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II. Renormalization group transformations: Keeping track of the correlations 
and interactions between all the components of a system undergoing a phase 
transition is – given the large number of components and the diverging 
correlation length – practically impossible. So-called renormalization group 
transformations (henceforth, RG transformations) deal with this intractability 
by redefining the characteristic length, at which the interactions among the 
components of the system at issue are described. Repeatedly applying RG 
transformations amounts to a re-description of the system, say fluid F, on 
larger and larger length scales while preserving the mathematical form of the 
“original” complicated Hamiltonian. The transformed Hamiltonian describes 
a system (and the interactions between its components) with less degrees of 
freedom than the original Hamiltonian. In sum, the RG transformation is a 
mathematically sophisticated coarse-graining procedure eliminating micro-
details that are irrelevant for the explanation of universality.  
III. The flow of Hamiltonians: Suppose we start with the original Hamiltonian H 
of a fluid F undergoing a phase transition. Then, one repeatedly applies the 
RG transformation and obtains other more ‘coarse-grained’ Hamiltonians. 
Interestingly, these different Hamiltonians “flow” to a fixed point in the 
space of possible Hamiltonians, which describes a specific behavior 
characterized by a critical exponent (Batterman 2000: 143). Now suppose 
there is another fluid F* and its behavior (during phase transition) is 
described by the initial Hamiltonian H*. Repeatedly applying the RG 
transformation to H* generates other, more ‘coarse-grained’ Hamiltonians. If 
the Hamiltonians representing fluid F* and fluid F turn out to “flow” to the 
same fixed point, then their behavior, when undergoing phase transition, is 
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characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 85; Batterman 
2000: 143). 
 
In sum, these three elements of RG explanations allow us to determine whether 
systems with different original Hamiltonians belong to the same “universality 
class” and are characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 87). 
Two systems belong to the same universality class, if reiterating RG 
transformations reveals that both systems “flow” to the same fixed point.  
 
4. Defending the Commonality Strategy 
Now, let me turn to the central question: are RG explanations in accord with the 
commonality strategy for explaining the occurrence of universal (or multiply 
realized) macro-behavior? I believe the answer is ‘yes’, because RG explanations 
enable us to understand two things: first, they reveal that systems with different 
micro-structures (represented by different ‘original’ Hamiltonians) belong to the 
same universality class. Second, RG explanations also show that and why some 
systems with different micro-structures in fact belong to different universality 
classes. RG explanations reveal that whether a physical system belongs to some 
universality class depends on features such as the symmetry properties of the 
order parameter (such as magnetization) and the spatial dimensionality of the 
physical system in question (Fischer 1998: 675; see also Fischer 1982; Wilson 
1983; Cardy 1996; McComb 2004).3  
                                                
3 Alternative theories of explanation will analyze this notion of dependence in 
different ways. Butterfield (2011) and Norton (2012) are likely to do so in a 
covering-law framework; the counterfactual theory of explanation I favor 
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RG explanations identify common properties of microscopically quite 
different physical systems. In positive analogy with Papineau’s example of the 
property of mean kinetic energy, a liquid (such as water) and a piece of iron 
undergoing phase transitions also have something explanatory in common: 
namely, the symmetry properties of the order parameter and the spatial 
dimensionality of the physical system. Continuing the analogy to the example of 
mean kinetic energy, the relevant symmetry properties and the spatial 
dimensionality are a part of an explanation of the multiply realized macroscopic 
behavior in question. The fact that microscopically very different physical 
systems have these properties in common (partially) explains why these physical 
systems display the same macro-behavior. Knowing that microscopically 
different systems share these properties renders the occurrence of universal 
macro-behavior no longer “entirely mysterious” (to use Fodor’s words). Thus, 
RG explanations conform to the commonality strategy.  
Let me add two qualifications. First, I take it that RG explanations follow 
the commonality strategy independently of whether one takes them to be (a) 
causal or non-causal, and (b) reductive or non-reductive explanations. Second, in 
addition to Papineau (1993), Lange (2015: section 4) articulates an excellent 
general defense of the commonality strategy – or a “common feature” account – 
for other explanations concerned with multiply realized macro-behavior. Lange’s 
main example is an explanation by the physicist John Herschel. Herschel 
explains a kind of macro-behavior (here, statistical features of the diffusion 
through a homogeneous, boundless, two-dimensional medium) relying on the 
                                                                                                                               
interprets dependence in terms of (non-causal) counterfactual dependencies 
(Reutlinger forthcoming). 
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rotational symmetry of the micro-laws (Lange 2015: 300-302). Although Lange 
(2015: 300) mentions RG explanations, he does not engage in a detailed 
discussion of whether they fall under the commonality strategy. I see my 
argument in this section as supporting Papineau’s and Lange’s more general 
claims.  
Batterman anticipates my line of argument and replies:  
 
“the RG analysis also demonstrated certain physical features – the 
spatial dimension and the symmetry property of the order 
parameter – that are shared by the systems in the universality class. 
These properties are not sufficient for a system to exhibit the upper 
level universal behavior” (Batterman 2000: 136, emphasis added; 
also Batterman and Rice 2014: 361). 
 
This response falls short of being a convincing criticism of the commonality 
strategy. First and foremost, it strikes me as uncharitable to read Papineau’s idea 
that multiple realization is explained by reference to a “physical property present 
in all and only” the microscopically different physical systems exhibiting the 
same macro-behavior as the claim that this common property also has to be 
sufficient for explaining the macro-behavior in question. Moreover, the 
requirement that the common properties be sufficient for explaining the macro-
behavior is unnecessarily strong and an advocate of the commonality strategy 
need not accept it. Even if properties such as spatial dimensionality and the 
symmetry properties of the order parameter alone are not sufficient for 
explaining universal behavior, this fact does not highlight a difference between 
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RG explanations and our paradigm of the commonality strategy, the statistical 
mechanical explanation of the ideal gas law. Mean kinetic energy alone is also 
not sufficient for explaining the macro-behavior described by the ideal gas law (a 
point I already mentioned in Section 2). Instead, a bridge law4 connecting mean 
kinetic energy and temperature, statistical principles, and the general (dynamical) 
laws of statistical mechanics are further non-redundant parts of a larger statistical 
mechanical explanation of the ideal gas law. (Note that the bridge laws, 
statistical principles, and the general dynamical laws apply to microscopically 
different systems.) This larger statistical mechanical explanation is sufficient for 
explaining the macro-behavior. 
The analogy between an RG explanation of universality and the 
statistical-mechanical explanation of the ideal gas law suggests that a proponent 
of the commonality strategy need not (and should not) require that the common 
property be sufficient for the macro-behavior in question. It is more reasonable 
to demand that the common property be a non-redundant part of an explanation 
for the macro-behavior. As Lange has recently expressed this point, a proponent 
of the commonality strategy “need not say that simply citing the common 
features suffices; it can require that an explanation show how the common 
                                                
4 As a referee remarked, the correct interpretation of bridge laws is crucial for 
deciding whether RG explanations are reductive explanations and, moreover, 
whether RG explanations support the claim of reductive physicalism (in which 
Papineau is interested). However, my aim in this paper is not to get involved in 
debates on reductive explanations and, even less, on reductive physicalism. For 
this reason, I rely on Dizadji-Bahmani et al.’s (2010: 404) minimalist account of 
bridge laws according to which bridge laws are interpreted as correlations 
between macroscopic and microscopic physical quantities. This account of 
bridge laws has two advantages: (a) the account is neutral with respect to 
reductive physicalism, and (b) Dizadji-Bahmani et al.’s account of bridge laws is 
compatible with multiple realization – one of Batterman’s main qualms with 
respect to bridge laws (Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010: 406-407). 
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features result in the macrobehavior.” (Lange 2015: 299) If this general point 
regarding the commonality strategy is true, then the dimensionality and the 
symmetry properties of the order parameter are best understood as a non-
redundant (but not sufficient) part of a more encompassing and ultimately 
sufficient statistical-mechanical explanation – that is, an explanation involving 
the elements of the RG explanans plus the bridge laws, the general (dynamical) 
laws, and further statistical principles of statistical mechanics (see Section 3). 
(Note once more that the bridge laws, the general dynamical laws, and the 
statistical principles apply to microscopically very different systems.) Hence, 
Batterman’s objection can be refuted, and one can subsume RG explanations 
under the commonality strategy in analogy with the statistical-mechanical 
explanation of the ideal gas law. 
Let me conclude by pointing out a strength of understanding RG 
explanations as an instance of the commonality strategy. The commonality 
strategy is compatible with one central insight of RG theory, namely, that many 
micro-details are not relevant for the explanation of the universal macro-
behavior in question (a point that Batterman emphasizes repeatedly; for instance, 
Batterman 2000: 128). To put it in Papineau’s words, the commonality strategy 
is not based “the absurdly strong requirement that the instances of the reduced 
category should share all their physical properties” (Papineau 1993: 35) – such a 
strong requirement would indeed be incompatible with RG explanations. 
However, the commonality strategy fortunately allows for vast microscopic 
differences among the physical systems exhibiting the same macro-behavior.  
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5. Conclusion 
RG explanations are often taken to explain universal or multiply realized macro-
behavior. Batterman has repeatedly argued that RG explanation do not work by 
conforming to the commonality strategy, i.e. such explanations do not account 
for a kind of universal or multiply realized macro-behavior by referring to 
properties that microscopically quite different systems have in common. 
Following Papineau’s (1993) and Lange’s (2015) general defense of the 
commonality strategy, I opposed Batterman’s claim by defending the view that 
RG explanations do in fact conform to the commonality strategy. I have claimed 
that, according to RG explanations, the properties common to microscopically 
different systems (such as the symmetry properties of the order parameter and 
spatial dimensionality) are a relevant part of a larger explanation of universal 
macro-behavior (involving Hamiltonians, RG transformations, the flow of 
Hamiltonians, and the laws and postulates of statistical mechanics).     
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